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The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm (2010) (Third Restatement)1  seeks to synthesize, 
clarify, and rationalize the law of negligence by restating its 
elements and basic rules in progressive, modern terms.  Prominent 
among its provisions is section 7, which contains the presumption 
of a duty to exercise reasonable care that is applicable in most cases 
and rules for what should be rare instances of “no-duty” 
determinations.2 
 
       †   Larry S. Stewart is a member of the Council of the American Law Institute 
and is an adviser for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm (2010).  He is board certified as a civil trial lawyer by the Florida 
Bar and the National Board of Trial Advocacy and is a member of the American 
College of Trial Lawyers, the American Board of Trial Advocates, the International 
Academy of Trial Lawyers, the International Society of Barristers, and the Inner 
Circle of Advocates.  A frequent author and lecturer in tort law, he has received 
numerous professional awards. 
 1. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & Emotional 
Harm is not yet finished.  See Current Projects, Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org
/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=16 (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).  
Chapters one through six, which cover definitions, negligence, duty, strict liability, 
factual cause, and scope of liability were published in 2010 as Volume 1.  Id.  
Volume 2, covering affirmative duties, emotional harm, and landowner liability 
also have been approved but await the drafting of a final chapter on the liability of 
actors who retain independent contractors.  Id. 
 2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
7 (2010).  Courts are already embracing key provisions of section 7.  See Van Fossen 
v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 696 (Iowa 2009) (discussing the new 
1
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There is much to applaud in this treatment of duty, although, 
in some respects, the Third Restatement could have gone further 
and provided more clarity.  This comment explores the rules 
provided, how those rules could be clarified, and provides 
suggestions for how the analytical process could be improved.  
Specifically, this comment makes five points: (1) “social norms,” as 
distinguished from public policy, are antithetical to the core 
rationale for duty and should play no role in duty determinations;3 
(2) cost-benefit analyses should also play no role in duty 
determinations;4 (3) the Third Restatement has it right on the role 
of relationality;5 (4) the role of discretionary government authority 
could be better explained in terms of an affirmative duty analysis;6 
and (5) further guidance could be provided for the duty analysis 
process.7 
I. DUTY UNDER SECTION 7 
The role of duty in modern tort law has not been without 
controversy.  At times it served as a means to expand tort law; in 
more recent times, it has been increasingly applied regressively to 
roll back tort liability.8  Commentators have disagreed on its proper 
role.9  Decisions have been confusing with some declaring that duty 
 
no-duty framework and finding that “summary judgment was . . . proper under 
[the court’s] newly adopted analytical principles”); Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 
N.W.2d 829, 835 (Iowa 2009) (“We find the drafters’ clarification of the duty 
analysis in the Restatement (Third) compelling, and we now, therefore, adopt 
it.”); A.W. v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 917 (Neb. 2010) 
(considering the new duty rules and finding “the reasoning of the Restatement 
(Third), and . . . fellow courts that have endorsed it, to be persuasive”); see also 
Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 235 (Ariz. 2007) (Hurwitz, J., concurring) (noting 
that while it made no difference which version of the duty rule was adopted in the 
present case, there are “advantages of the Third Restatement approach to duty” 
and suggesting the court adopt that approach in the future). 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See infra Part IV. 
 6. See infra Part V. 
 7. See infra Part VI. 
 8. W. Johnathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 
671, 672 (2008) (discussing California’s important role in the “development of the 
modern law of duty” and noting that the California Supreme Court “first swe[pt] 
aside a variety of no-duty impediments to liability and then reinvigorat[ed] duty 
(more accurately, no-duty) as an instrument for limiting liability as the expansion 
of tort law ground to a halt and reversed course in the 1980s and 1990s”). 
 9. Id. at 671 (“Academics . . . continue to battle over the proper role for duty 
in contemporary tort law.”). 
2
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is categorical and others treating duty as fact-specific or grounded 
in foreseeability concepts.10 
The duty rules delineated in section 7 of the Third 
Restatement bring clarity to the law by restating the general rule 
that all actors have a duty to exercise care to prevent injury to 
others “when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”11  
As the Third Restatement makes clear, this presumption of duty is 
the default rule that applies in the vast majority of cases and 
circumstances and trial courts generally need not concern 
themselves with the existence of a duty.12 
Under section 7, the obligation is on one claiming that a duty 
should not exist to raise and prevail on that claim.13  In that sense, it 
is section 7(b) that does the duty determination work but section 
7(a) provides the basis of an analytical framework by grounding 
duty in the presumption that a duty exists.  Section 7 also 
constrains duty determinations by making clear that foreseeability 
is a matter of causation, not duty, and foreseeability concepts play 
no role in duty determination.14  Likewise, section 7 comments 
make clear that the duty rubric should not be used to invade the 
province of the jury.15  Hence, determinations based on a lack of 
evidence (where reasonable minds can differ) are matters of 
liability, not duty, and the two should not be conflated.16 
To ensure the limited scope of no-duty determinations and to 
preserve the integrity of trial by jury, section 7(b) provides that only 
in “exceptional cases, when an articulated principle or policy 
warrants denying or limiting [duty] in a particular class of cases” 
should courts adopt a no-duty rule.17  Comments to section 7 
 
 10. Id. at 671–78.  
 11. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 7(a) (2010) (stating that an actor has a duty when his “conduct creates a 
risk of physical harm”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 (1965) 
(describing a negligent act as one that involves an “unreasonable risk of harm to 
another”).  The duty to exercise care applies to both acts and omissions.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmts. 
c, k (2010).  It also applies to situations where the actor has an affirmative duty to 
act.  Id. §§ 37–44 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§§ 6 cmt. f, 7 cmt. a. 
 13. Id. § 7 cmt. b. 
 14. Id. § 7 cmt. j. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. § 7 cmt. i. 
 17. Duty determinations include limitations on duty short of a complete no-
duty determination.  Id. § 7(b) (“[A] court may decide that the defendant has no 
3
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emphasize that any such rulings should be categorical, bright-line 
rulings that are not fact-specific and admonish courts “to 
articulate . . . the policy or principle” on which they are acting.18 
This formulation will, in large part, bring much needed clarity 
to the law.  Requiring courts to articulate their reasoning allows 
transparency that will foster understanding or allow others to 
challenge the basis for the decision.  Limiting no-duty rules to 
exceptional categories of cases protects the long-standing right of 
parties to trial by jury.  Additionally, bright-line rules avoid the 
confusion of decisions that mask factual determinations with a duty 
rubric. 
But, for all it has accomplished, the Third Restatement could 
have brought more clarity.  While duty issues arise only at the 
margin in a very small number of cases, in making duty 
determinations courts sometimes use inappropriate case-specific 
“factors” and/or rely on “factors” that conflict with the 
fundamental rights that are the core of section 7 duty.19  That 
should not happen in a well-ordered regime.  While public policy, 
conflicts with other domains of law, and institutional competence 
are undisputed bases on which courts determine that no tort duty 
exists,20 social norms, cost-benefit considerations, and the 
relationship between the parties should not be the basis of a no-
duty determination.  Even though courts correctly decide that 
governmental entities have no duty to exercise their discretionary 
functions,21 those decisions could be better grounded.  Finally, 
more guidance could be provided for how courts should navigate 
the process of duty determination.  The balance of this comment 
explores those subjects. 
 
duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.”) (emphasis 
added).  In the interest of brevity, “no duty” will be used herein to encompass the 
full range of possible duty rulings. 
 18. Id. § 7 cmts. a, i, j. 
 19. See, e.g., Great Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 
1990) (“In determining whether the defendant was under a duty, the court will 
consider several interrelated factors, including the risk, foreseeability, and 
likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the actor’s conduct, the 
magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of 
placing the burden on the defendant.”). 
 20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 7(b) cmts. d, f (2010). 
 21. See id. § 7 cmt. g. 
4
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II. SOCIAL NORMS 
Comment “c” to section 7 endorses “articulating general social 
norms of responsibility as the basis for [a no-duty] 
determination.”22  To properly examine the role this factor should 
play, it must first be distinguished from public policy.  “Public 
policy” and “social norms” have, at times, been used 
interchangeably.23  While public policy implicates moral judgments, 
social norms are different.  Although  difficult to define, public 
policy is grounded on a common or community judgment about 
what is inherently just and right for public health, safety, and 
welfare, sometimes but not necessarily as declared by constitution, 
statute, or judicial decision.24  By definition, social norms on the 
other hand can, but do not necessarily, involve a moral 
component.25  They are commonly understood as describing 
conduct that is typical of specific groups.26  Often they follow or 
mirror public opinion and are therefore subject to change with the 
whims of popular opinion.27 
 
 
 22. Id. § 7 cmt. c. 
 23. See, e.g., Noye v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 570 A.2d 12, 14 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1990) (discussing tort damages in a breach of contract context and 
stating that “[t]he tort lay not in the breach of contract but in the violation of 
valuable social norms-denominated by the court as clear mandates of public 
policy”). 
 24.    E.g., Bell Care Nurses Registry, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 25 So. 3d 13, 18 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing the meaning of public policy when 
interpreting certain provisions of an insurance policy); Mullins v. N. Ky. 
Inspections, Inc., No. 2009-CA-000067-MR., 2010 WL 3447630, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. 
Sept. 3, 2010) (discussing this definition of public policy when considering a 
liability limiting provision in a home inspector’s contract); Skutt v. Grand Rapids, 
266 N.W. 344, 346 (Mich. 1936) (considering “the rule of public policy” when 
determining the enforceability of a contract). 
 25. See Scott R. Belhorn, Note, Settling Beyond the Shadow of the Law: How 
Mediation Can Make the Most of Social Norms, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 981, 985 
n.10 (2005) (“Normative standards encompass a wide range of socially 
conditioned information, ranging from moral judgments (do not lie), to 
community norms (do not smoke near others), to shared values within a discrete 
nuclear family . . . to industry-wide practices . . . .”).  
 26. Id. at 984 (“When a group encourages some behavior, either by providing 
incentives for conformity or else sanctioning deviants, then that behavior qualifies 
as a social norm.”). 
 27. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 
959 (1996) (discussing the relationship between the law and social norms and 
noting that “[p]eople may actually reject existing norms but fail to state their 
opposition publicly, and once public opposition becomes less costly, new norms 
may rapidly come into place”). 
5
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The issue of social host liability illustrates these differences and 
exploring those cases exposes the conceptual flaws inherent in 
relying on social norms as a factor for duty determinations.  It can 
be the social norm for a host to provide alcoholic drinks to guests, 
even though it can be dangerous or harmful to others and can 
induce conduct that is contrary to public policy.  Because it is 
foreseeable that social guests who over-consume alcohol will, on 
leaving the host’s premises, operate their vehicles in ways that risk 
harm to others, social host liability cannot be causally limited.  
Courts expressly or impliedly recognize this social norm by treating 
these cases as involving duty issues. 
Most, if not all, jurisdictions have strong public policies against 
driving under the influence of alcohol.28  Some courts cite those 
policies as reasons for imposing a duty of reasonable care on social 
hosts.  This reasoning is at odds with the section 7 presumption of 
duty but nonetheless reaches a result that is consistent with section 
7’s duty presumption, and which reflects the lack of policy reasons 
for denying a duty.29  In doing so, these courts recognize that it is 
public policy, not social norms, that are determinative. 
Other courts (and dissenting opinions in duty jurisdictions) 
couple concerns about the difficulties posed by the range of 
circumstances that could exist in such cases—the widely varying 
nature of social entertaining, the difficulty of discerning guest 
intoxication, and the uncertainty of what actions the host should 
take—and disruption in the norms of social behavior as grounds 
 
 28. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1226 (N.J. 1984) (“[W]e assume 
that our decisions are found to be consonant with the strong legislative policy 
against drunken driving.”), superseded by statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:15-5.7 (2000). 
 29. See, e.g., Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Iowa 1985) (imposing a 
duty on a social host who provided alcohol to an intoxicated person where the 
host knew that person would be driving and finding public policy reasons 
supportive of its decision); Koback v. Crook, 366 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Wis. 1985) 
(imposing a duty on a social host and citing the reasoning in Gwinnell).  When it is 
minors who have consumed the alcohol, different public policy considerations 
may be invoked.  See, e.g., DiOssi v. Maroney, 548 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1988) 
(noting that there are “special hazards” and public policy concerns implicated in 
serving alcoholic beverages to minors); Sutter v. Hutchings, 327 S.E.2d 716, 720 
(Ga. 1985) (“Finally, we pose this question: Which is the more valuable right, the 
right to serve alcohol to one’s underage high school friends, or the right not to be 
killed by an intoxicated underage driver?  There is no right to serve alcohol to 
one’s underage high school friends.”), superseded by statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-40 
(2000); Longstreth v. Gensel, 377 N.W.2d 804, 815 (Mich. 1985) (“The dangers 
and policy considerations related to serving intoxicants are especially significant 
when underage persons are involved.”). 
6
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for denying a host duty.30  This reasoning, however, does not survive 
analysis as is demonstrated by examining those bases separately. 
Hypothesizing factual difficulties injects case-specific concerns 
into the calculus that are not capable of categorical 
characterization.  Thus, for example, a hypothetical difficulty in 
controlling the serving of alcohol would not be present in a case 
where the host provided a bartender.  Likewise, a hypothetical 
difficulty in discerning guest intoxication would not be present in a 
case where the guest was staggering and slurring speech.  To the 
extent relevant, those kinds of factual issues bear on the 
reasonableness or causality of the host’s conduct, not duty, and can 
support rulings as a matter of law only where reasonable minds 
cannot differ on the specific facts of the individual case.31 
Stripping the social norm of serving alcohol at social 
gatherings from case-specific issues focuses the inquiry on whether 
social norms are an appropriate factor for duty determinations.  
For example, would courts still find no duty in a case where a host 
engaged in binge drinking with guests to the point of obvious 
“knee walking” intoxication and a guest staggered to his car, drove 
a short distance, and crashed into another car causing horrible 
injuries and deaths?  Under those circumstances negligence and 
causation would be obvious.  Would then the social norm of serving 
alcohol alone be sufficient to justify a no-duty determination?  Or 
would a court find that while it is the social norm to serve alcohol, 
it is not the social norm to serve alcohol to the point of clear and 
obvious intoxication?  If identifying social norms is fact-specific or 
norms require parsing, categorical treatment unravels and courts 




 30. E.g., Johnston v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 788 P.2d 159 (Haw. 1990); 
Settlemyer v. Wilmington Veterans Post No. 49, 464 N.E.2d 521 (Ohio 1984); Graff 
v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1993); Burkhart v. Harrod, 755 P.2d 759 (Wash. 
1988). 
 31. E.g., McGuiggan v. New England Tele. & Tele. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141, 146 
(Mass. 1986) (holding as a matter of law that the defendant homeowners were not 
negligent because they did not serve alcohol to the guest nor were they aware of 
the guest’s intoxication); Sacci v. Metaxas, 810 A.2d 1119, 1126 (N.J. 2002) 
(holding that even if wife had a duty to warn third party of potential danger to the 
third party by her intoxicated husband, the wife’s purchase of alcohol for her 
husband was not a “proximate cause” of third party’s death because the husband’s 
actions were not the result of drinking but rather a systematic and deliberative 
process and wife had no knowledge of his activities). 
7
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More important, using a social norm (of serving alcohol at 
social gatherings) to trump public policies (against driving under 
the influence of alcohol) undermines core rationales of modern 
tort law.  Public policy is at the foundation of duty.32  The definition 
of duty has been notably stated as “the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular 
plaintiff is entitled to protection.”33 
Justifying no-duty on a basis that allows risky behavior contrary 
to public policy to trump the presumptive duty to exercise care to 
prevent harm to others is antithetical to the core rationale of tort 
duty.  In recognizing a presumptive duty to exercise care to prevent 
harm to others, the Third Restatement aligned itself with a rights-
based theory of tort law anchored in the fundamental right of 
individuals to be free from risks created by others or, put another 
way, in the right to individual autonomy and personal security.34  In 
such a regime, duty should not be dependent on a social norm 
inquiry.  That is because fundamental individual rights to 
autonomy and security should not be compromised or eliminated 
merely to conform tort law to some social norm, especially where 
that norm has no moral value.  It is only morally based public 
policy that should compel individual rights to give way to the 
welfare or well being of the community as a whole. 
Returning to the social host liability issue, it is the host’s 
conduct—in supplying alcohol, not monitoring its consumption, or 
allowing the intoxicated guest to drive—that creates a risk of harm 
to others.  The duty analysis should therefore begin with a 
presumption that the host had a duty to exercise reasonable care 
and the outcome should be based on sound public policies, not 
social norms. 
 
 32. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 53, at 358 (5th ed. 1984). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Mark A. Geistfeld, Social Value as a Policy-Based Limitation of the Ordinary 
Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 899, 906 (2009).  Geistfeld 
concludes that rights-based theory requires consideration of social values, a point 
that does not necessarily follow.  Id. at 922.  To the extent that social values 
conflicted with individual autonomy and personal security, they would limit, not 
support those objectives.  Id. at 906.  Rights-based concepts also underlie 
intentional tort rules, which protect against intentional invasion of individual 
autonomy and personal security.  Id.  Thus, whether conduct is merely negligent 
or even intentional, tort law recognizes a universal right to individual autonomy 
and personal security.  Id.  See, however, infra note 42 for a different view in the 
case of product liability design defect claims. 
8
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III. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES 
Cost-benefit analyses are a means to evaluate the 
reasonableness of conduct.35  They are at the core of efficiency 
rationales that seek to limit liability whenever the supposed costs of 
liability exceed its social benefits.  At a more functional level, they 
can be used to argue that an actor need not take actions that would 
be more costly than any benefit that could be realized.36  As such, 
cost-benefit analysis is part of the breach calculus, not a duty 
factor.37  Section 7 is, however, silent on their inapplicability in duty 
determination even though some courts cite cost-benefit analyses as 
a duty factor.  For example, in determining whether handgun 
manufacturers owe a marketing duty of care to the public, the 
court in Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. noted that duty “must be 
tailored to reflect accurately the extent that its social benefits 
outweigh its costs.”38 
When courts so reason, they conflate breach and duty, 
masking a no-breach decision or an inability to articulate the real 
principles that are driving the decision.  At other times, courts are 
simply citing “factors” that have no real relation to the decision-
making process.39  These are the type of results that the Third 
Restatement seeks to prevent by calling for clearly articulated, 
 
 35. See generally Paul R. Portney, Benefit-Cost Analysis, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/BenefitCostAnalysis.html (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2011) (discussing the use of cost-benefit economic analysis in the 
context of government policy-making). 
 36. Mark A. Geistfeld, Efficiency, Fairness and the Economic Analysis of Tort Law, 
in Theoretical Foundations of Law and Economics 45–46 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 184, 2009), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/184/. 
 37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
3 cmt. e (2010); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998) 
(adopting a risk-benefit theory as part of a new negligence standard for design 
defect cases).  While highly controversial, it illustrates that risk-benefit analyses go 
to breach, not duty.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) 
(1998); Symposium, The Products Liability Restatement: Was It a Success?: Strict Liability 
for Defective Product Design: The Quest for a Well-Ordered Regime, 74 BROOKLYN L. REV. 
1039, 1039 (2009). 
 38. 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1060–61 (N.Y. 2001); see also Burkhart v. Harrod, 755 P.2d 
759, 761 (Wash. 1988) (“Evaluating the overall merits of social host liability . . . 
requires a balancing of the costs and benefits for society as a whole.”). 
 39. E.g., Johnston v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 788 P.2d 159, 163–64 (Haw. 1990) 
(citing Burkhart v. Harrod, 755 P.2d 759, 761 (Wash. 1988) for the need for 
consideration of costs and benefits but not doing so); Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 
1060–61 (citing a cost-benefit analysis but then basing its decision on whether 
there was a duty to control third parties to prevent them from harming others). 
9
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principled duty decisions.40 
Courts should recognize that in making duty decisions, cost-
benefit analyses should play no role.  It is not just because doing so 
would conflate breach and duty.  As with the case of social norms, if 
cost-benefit analyses were used as a duty factor, it would sanction 
limiting individual rights to achieve net social values for the 
community at large—a result that would be antithetical to the core 
rationale for negligence liability.41  In other words, bending duty to 
efficiency would mean that whenever the costs of action outweigh 
its benefits, there would be no duty to undertake that action and 
individual rights would be required to give way.  Such a result 
would be repugnant to the individual rights of autonomy and 
personal security which lie at the core of tort duty.42 
There is also a serious question about the competence of 
courts to assess costs and benefits.  While the cost of adding 
components or features to a product is subject to ascertainment 
and proof, in many instances there is no ready way to measure the 
cost of conduct in exercising care.  Likewise, while there is some 
data on the cost of injuries which would be eliminated if harm was 
avoided, there is no other ready way to measure the benefits that 
could result from eliminating risky behavior.  Without empirical 
databases or case-specific evidence from a trial on the merits, the 
evaluation of costs and benefits would be left to the undisciplined 
speculation of individual judges.  In either event, these are fact-
specific inquires that relate to negligence, not duty.  It may be for 
those reasons that even though the Hamilton court articulated a 
cost-benefit approach it avoided undertaking any cost-benefit 
analysis as a basis for its decision. 
 
 
 40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
7 cmts. a, i, j (2010). 
 41. Id. § 6 cmt. d. 
 42. One aspect of tort law takes a contrary view.  Section 2(b) of Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability adopts a rule under which manufacturers 
would not be liable for defects in the design of their products unless the product is 
not reasonably safe, measured by whether the product’s risks are greater than its 
benefits (and whether there was an alternative design).  Rather than strict liability 
or a presumptive duty of care, from a design standpoint, products would be 
presumptively safe—even if they failed to perform as safely as an ordinary 
consumer would expect—unless the injured consumer could establish a sufficient 
quantum of risk.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (2009).  
That rule would subjugate individual rights to a cost-benefit analysis.  It has not 
been without controversy.  See Symposium, supra note 37, at 1044–48. 
10
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Returning again to the issue of social host liability illustrates 
the flaw of cost-benefit analyses as a basis for categorical decisions.  
Because of the many varying circumstances of social entertaining, 
the costs and benefits of exercising care will vary widely—a point 
implicitly made in many of the no-duty cases.43  Under such 
circumstances, whether costs or benefits predominate (or what 
might constitute reasonable care) in one case does not mean that 
the same result will follow in other cases.  That is a case-specific 
decision that cannot be extrapolated into a categorical rule and a 
clear admonition that cost-benefit analyses should not play any role 
in duty determination would help clarify the Third Restatement. 
IV. RELATIONALITY 
The Third Restatement correctly adopts the view that 
relationships between parties should not be a determinative duty 
factor except in the context of affirmative duties where certain 
“special” relationships give rise to a duty to act or control the 
conduct of third parties.44  Insofar as no-duty determinations under 
section 7(b) are concerned, inter-party relationships are relevant 
only to the extent that they implicate policy reasons for modifying 
the presumed duty of care.45 
This is so because in a rights-based regime, the presumptive 
duty to exercise care must apply to all persons, even complete 
strangers to the actor.  Allowing that duty to be attenuated by 
relationality concerns would necessarily mean that individual 
interests of some would be subjugated to a right of the actor to 
engage in risky behavior.  It would also require inquiry into many 
non-categorical, fact-specific, nuances of relationships that are the 
province of breach and causation.  It is for those reasons that 
relationality issues do not constitute a separate or independent 
basis for no-duty determinations but rather a reason for invoking 
public policy.46  Thus, the relationship between landowners and 
those on their property may be a basis for invoking public policies 
concerning the rights of property owners, but it is the public 
policies, not the relationship, which is the operating principle.  
 
 43.   See, e.g., Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1993) (hypothesizing 
on the myriad of circumstances of social entertaining). 
 44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
39 (2010). 
 45. Id. § 7 cmt. e. 
 46. Id. § 7 cmts. e, g reporters’ note. 
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Stated another way, the relationship between parties is not a per se 
duty “limitation.” 
V. GOVERNMENT DISCRETION 
Comment “g” to section 7 notes deference to the discretion of 
other branches of government as a factor for no-duty 
determinations in the so-called “public duty” class of cases.  When 
not prohibited by sovereign immunity, these cases typically involve 
police or fire agencies and arise when the agencies fail to act to 
protect an individual or group of individuals, usually as a result of a 
conscious allocation of resources.47  Often these decisions are based 
on a lack of a duty to the “public at large” and/or concerns over 
the competence of courts to adjudicate the appropriateness of 
conduct of other branches of government.48  But that avoids a more 
obvious and principled basis for decision. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with treating these cases as 
a unique set of section 7 no-duty decisions.  Because of the strong 
reluctance of courts to “second guess” discretionary decisions of 
other branches of government,49 they could also be treated as a sub-
set of institutional competence.  But those alternatives create a 
certain conceptual awkwardness since the discretionary nature of 
the government’s authority and institutional competence does not 
eliminate a duty to exercise care once the government entity 
undertakes to act in relation to an individual or specific group of 
individuals.50  Stripping away the discretionary nature of the 
conduct and the reluctance of courts to second-guess decisions of 
other branches of government leaves a decision not to act, which 
forms the basis for a more coherent and principled reason for 
these no-duty decisions. 
 
 47. Id. § 7 cmt. f reporters’ note. 
 48. E.g., Wong v. City of Miami, 237 So. 2d 132, 133–34 (Fla. 1970) (holding 
that after initially providing police protection during the course of a riot, no 
private duty to continue that protection existed). 
 49. E.g., id. at 134 (stating that “[t]he sovereign authorities ought to be left 
free to exercise their discretion and choose the tactics deemed appropriate 
without worry over possible allegations of negligence”). 
 50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
41 (2010).  Thus, for example, governmental agencies can be liable for the use of 
excessive force.  See City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1965) ( finding 
a police officer committed assault in effecting arrest); Jaworski v. City of Opa 
Locka, 170 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (explaining the failure to exercise 
care for the protection of someone in custody when a police officer assaulted a 
prisoner in custody in the city’s jail). 
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Under section 7 there is no affirmative duty of reasonable care 
when the actor’s conduct has not created the risk of harm.51  The 
failure of government agencies to exercise discretion and act does 
not create the risk of harm but only fails to protect against that 
harm.  This is a classic section 7 case.  Thus, it can be reasoned that 
government agencies have no duty to come to the aid or rescue of 
specific individuals or groups of individuals but, once they do 
undertake action involving a specific individual, they have a duty to 
exercise care to avoid causing harm.  It is only the former situation 
where courts do not intrude. 
VI. A HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE 
Ensuring that no-duty determinations are not based on social 
norms, cost-benefit analyses, or the absence of any relational status 
and, instead, are based on recognized public policy, clear conflicts 
with other domains of law, or demonstrable institutional 
incompetence will narrow the focus of no-duty inquiries for the 
better.  It will bring order, clarity, and consistency to decisions and 
will help segregate the elements of negligence so that the roles of 
judge and jury are maintained.  Moreover, clarifying that 
foreseeability plays no role in duty determinations furthers those 
goals and dissuades courts from masking fact-based decisions in 
duty rubric. 
Apart from those important boundary rules, the Third 
Restatement also provides an analytical structure for no-duty 
determinations.  The beginning point is the presumption of duty 
with the burden on the objector to establish policy or principle 
reasons why that duty should not exist.52  Thus, the no-duty issue 
should be whether there are valid public policy reasons, clear 
irreconcilable conflicts with other domains of law, or irreconcilable 
issues of institutional competence to exempt categories of actors 
from the duty to exercise reasonable care.53 
 
 51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 7 cmt. 1 (2010). 
 52. Id. at § 7 cmt. b.  See, e.g., Yount v. Johnson, 915 P.2d 341, 345–47 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1996) (finding no public policy reasons to extend the modified duty 
applicable in organized contact sports to “horseplay”). 
 53. Courts have frequently reversed the analysis.  Instead of starting with the 
presumptive duty of reasonable care, some courts use public policy to find a duty.  
See, e.g., J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998) (using public policy and 
foreseeability to hold spouse had a duty to warn of other spouse’s criminal sexual 
propensities).  While the result is the same, following the analytical framework of 
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Unfortunately, the Third Restatement provides little guidance 
for how those factors should be evaluated in the duty decision-
making process.  It is not enough to only exhort courts to make 
categorical rulings and articulate reasons for decisions.  Leaving it 
to individual courts to form their own methodology (or not use one 
at all) can result in unprincipled or unpredictable duty 
determinations.  For example, without any guidelines, two different 
courts could consider identical factors in identical cases and yet 
come to opposite conclusions depending on the personal 
philosophies, experiences, or proclivities of the judges.  A fully 
developed set of rules should not permit that outcome. 
A starting point for guidance can be found in the foundational 
precepts of individual rights and the basic rationales for negligence 
law.54  Thus, as a matter of proper perspective, individual autonomy 
and personal security should be at the foundation of all duty 
determinations.55  These rights would not necessarily trump other 
factors.  Courts would still be free to conform duty to public policy 
or to consider conflicts with other domains of law or institutional 
incompetence, but using these rights to inform the decision would 
provide an important baseline reference for duty determinations.  
In weighing the duty issue, those rights should not be lightly 
compromised.  Thus, contravening public policy should be clear, 
conflicts with other domains of law or institutional incompetence 
should be substantial, and those factors should justify duty 
modification only where there is irreconcilable conflict and an 
articulable basis to justify trumping the presumptive tort duty. 
A second baseline is provided by the twin negligence rationales 
of corrective justice and deterrence of socially dangerous 
behavior.56  Tort law remedies an injustice caused by the defendant 
 
the Third Restatement will result in a more coherent, understandable decision.  
Thus, in J.S. foreseeability should have played no role and the presumptive duty to 
exercise care and the absence of any public policy considerations to modify that 
duty were sufficient. 
 54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 6 cmt. d (2010). 
 55.  While individual autonomy applies equally to all actors, there is no 
conflict in subjugating an actor’s autonomy to other individuals’ rights to personal 
security since there is no right to engage in risky behavior that could harm others 
and such conduct violates basic public policy that one’s activities be conducted in 
a socially reasonable way. 
 56. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 6 cmt. d (2010). 
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and provides an incentive to engage in safe conduct.  The overall 
social welfare is improved and activities are forced to be conducted 
in a prudent manner—outcomes that are generally consistent with 
the goals of public policy.  No-duty rules prevent these ameliorative 
effects and courts should avoid them only where there are clear 
and strong reasons to do so.  In other words, unless the scales tip 
clearly in favor of no-duty, the presumptive rule should apply. 
To be sure, applying these rules to duty determinations will 
not be decisive and courts will still have to use reason and logic, but 
adhering to these rules would clarify analysis.  Furthermore, clearly 
articulated reasoning in “bright-line” decisions would reduce 
confusion, produce principled, replicable decisions, and, 
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